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Abstract
We compare signaling by words and actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with
private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing,
can signal by contributing rst (actions) or by sending a costless message (words). Words
can be about the return or about her contribution decision. Theoretically, actions lead
to fully e¢ cient contributions. Words can be as inuential as actions, and thus elicit the
uninformed players contribution, but allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact
language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, we nd that words can be as
inuential as actions. Free-riding, however, does depend on the language: the informed
player free-rides less when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the
returns.
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1 Introduction
Popular proverbs about words and actions are abundant. While some say an Englishmans
word is his bond, others say that actions speak louder than words(Knowles, 2006). Indeed
words can be just cheap talk (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). But can words speak as loud as
actions? Furthermore, does the e¤ectiveness of words depend on what words are spoken?
Our aim is to compare words and actions in a public good game with private information,
and vary the set of words (i.e., the language) that can be used.
In public good games, the inuence of actions, or more precisely, of it being common
knowledge that some actions are observed, has been widely studied. Theoretically, Hermalin
(1998) and Vesterlund (2003), show that, if informed players contribute rst to a team
project or charity, they can lead by example: their contribution can elicit the contribution of
uninformed players and enhance e¢ ciency. Experimentally, Potters et al (2007) nd support
for these results1. The role of being allowed to talk about the return to a contribution, or
about the size of the own contribution, however, has remained unexplored in contexts like
these2. We examine the potential inuence of words theoretically, and test the resulting
hypotheses experimentally.
Our analysis proceeds in the context of a two-player one-shot public good game. The
game is symmetric with respect to the playerscontributions. The return to a contribution
can take three di¤erent values, which are equally likely. If the return is low, it is individually
rational and (Pareto) e¢ cient not to contribute. If it is intermediate, the game is a prisoners
dilemma: it is e¢ cient to contribute, but each player has an incentive to free ride. Finally,
if the return is high, contributing is both individually rational and e¢ cient. The exact state
of nature, however, is only known to one of the players. The parameters are set such that, in
case no signaling is possible, the uninformed player will not contribute. On the other hand,
if the uninformed player knows that the return is either intermediate or high, and considers
both possibilities to be equally likely, he will contribute. If no signaling is possible, the
informed player only contributes when the return is high and the uninformed player never
contributes, hence, contributions are ine¢ ciently low.
1Several studies have investigated the e¤ect of observing another players contribution before deciding
ones own (sequential moves) in complete information settings (e.g. Güth et al, 2007, Moxnes and van der
Heijden, 2003). We consider a situation in which there is private information.
2The e¤ect of communication in social dilemmas has been frequently studied, but in most cases, again
assuming complete information (see Balliet, 2010, for a recent meta-analysis).
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We compare two di¤erent kinds of signaling by the informed player: actions and words.
In the rst case, as in Potters et al (2007), the informed player moves rst and her contribu-
tion is revealed before the uninformed player makes his contribution decision. The informed
player now has an incentive to contribute if (and only if) the return is high or intermedi-
ate. Her contribution then signals to the uninformed player that he should contribute as
well. Consequently, the actions of the informed player are inuential: they determine the
uninformed players contribution. As both players contribute unless the returns are low, the
game with signaling by actions produces a fully e¢ cient outcome.
To study the e¤ect of words, we allow for two di¤erent languages. The rst language
allows the informed player to talk about the return to a contribution. She can say the
return is low, the return is intermediate, or the return is high. The second language
allows her to talk about her contribution decision. The informed player can say I do not
contributeor I contribute. In both of these cases, talk is cheap, that is, the messages do
not directly inuence the payo¤s.
The traditional cheap talk literature has focused on two disjoint classes of games (Farrell
and Rabin, 1996): sender-receiver games with incomplete information, in which only the
uninformed player takes payo¤-relevant actions, and complete information games, where
pre-play communication is used to foster coordination or cooperation. In the rst case, the
informed player is allowed to talk about her type (the private information); in the second
case, she can talk about the action she intends to take. In our public good game, there is
private information and both players take payo¤-relevant actions. We allow the informed
player to either talk about the return to a contribution (her type), or about the action she
intends to take. The existing literature has shown that each type of communication can be
e¤ective in the respective class of games, and has investigated under which circumstances
such communication is most e¤ective. The game we employ allows us to investigate the
e¤ectiveness of these types of communication within one framework.
From a standard theoretical perspective, the exact language is irrelevant: for any lan-
guage that allows at least two di¤erent messages, there are two pure equilibrium outcomes3.
In the rst equilibrium, words are ignored - considered as just cheap talk - and contribution
levels are as in the game without signaling. In the second equilibrium, the informed player
sends the same message (say G) when the state is intermediate and when it is high, and a
3The baseline game and the game with signaling through actions each have a unique equilibrium, and
this is in pure strategies; the game with words also has mixed strategy equilibria.
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di¤erent message (say B) when the return is low. The uninformed player contributes only
after having heard G, hence, words can as be inuential as actions.
Note that, for the two languages considered in this paper, all messages have a natural (or
focal) meaning: although messages need not be believed, they will always be understood.
Our work, hence, is in the tradition of Farrell (1985, 1993), who was the rst to argue that
messages having a literal meaning may destabilize certain equilibrium outcomes4. We show
that, in our context, only the inuential equilibrium outcome, is neologism-proof (Farrell,
1993), hence, we focus on this outcome. For the uninformed player, we thus predict the
same behavior under words as under actions. In contrast, words allow the informed player
to free ride when the return is intermediate. In the equilibrium with actions, this player is
forced to contribute when the return is intermediate, but, since her contribution cannot be
observed by the receiver in the case of words, theory predicts that she will contribute less
in that case.
Existing theory thus predicts that (1) words can be as inuential as actions (the informed
player communicates the same information about the returns in both situations, to which
the uninformed player responds in the same way); (2) the informed player will contribute
less under words than under actions (as, under words, this player will free ride in the
intermediate state); and (3) that it does not matter which words can be used. We test these
hypotheses experimentally.
Our experiment reveals that words indeed can be as inuential as actions. Informed
players most frequently use the message the state is high(resp. I contribute), both when
the state is intermediate and high, to which uninformed players react by contributing, as
they do after observing a contribution of the informed player. Moreover, as predicted, when
the state is intermediate, the rate of free riding by the informed player is much lower in
case signaling is by actions (19% of the time) than in case signaling is by words (81% of
the time, averaged across both languages). Still, in contrast to what theory predicts, it
does matter what language is available. There are two key di¤erences. First, while existing
theory remains silent about which messages will be used, actual behavior displays important
regularity: informed players strongly make use of the natural meaning of the words that
are available. Secondly, and perhaps more striking, while free riding by the informed player
4There is a separate literature that builds on the presumption that messages, whilst not having an
inherent meaning, may acquire meaning through an evolutionary learning approach; see Blume et al (2001)
for a comparison of the two approaches.
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is almost universal (94%) when talk is about the return, it falls signicantly when she
talks about her contribution (68%). In the specic case that the informed player says I
contribute, she in fact contributes 41% of the time, revealing that for some players a word
can be a bond.
We address both discrepancies in this paper. The rst is rather easily dealt with by a
theoretical extension of the ideas underlying Farrells neologism-proofness concept: if unin-
formed players are likely to interpret messages according to their literal meaning, informed
players will use messages according to their literal meaning, whenever this is a credible
statement.
We suggest two, potentially complementary, explanations for the fact that the extent
of free riding depends on the language that is available. Both explanations build on the
idea that players dislike lying to some degree. The rst explanation is in line with previous
experimental studies, which nd that lying depends on the associated consequences, that
is, on the costs and benets that follow from the lie (Gneezy, 2005, Hurkens and Kartik,
2009)5. In our game, not lying is less costly when talk is about the contribution than when
talking about the returns. When talking about the return, if the informed player reveals the
intermediate state truthfully, the uninformed player no longer contributes, which decreases
the informed players payo¤ substantially. In contrast, in talking about her contribution, the
informed player can avoid lying at a low cost by indeed contributing if she says I contribute.
In this case, the uninformed player still contributes and the informed player does not forgo
as much monetary payo¤.
The second explanation elaborates on a similar idea by arguing that there may be dif-
ferent types of lies, and that some lies may be perceived as being more costly than others.
In this respect, we note that the message I contributeis similar to a promise, as it refers to
an action of the speaker. In contrast, the message the returns are highdoes not resemble
a promise. The norm that promises should be kept may be stronger than the norm that
one should not lie, and, therefore, players may be less likely to not contribute when they
have announced a contribution. The similarity of the message I contributeto I promise
to contribute could thus be a driving force behind the decrease in free-riding. In social
5See Kartik et al (2007) and Kartik (2009), among others, for models of sender receiver games in which such
costs of lying are allowed. Demichelis and Weibull (2008) follow a similar approach, assuming that players
have a lexicographic preference, after payo¤s, for choosing an action which is in line with the meaning of the
message they send.
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dilemmas and trust games, with symmetric information, promises are often made and kept,
especially when communication is free-form (Balliet, 2010, Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006,
Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004, Vanberg, 2008). Our experiment reveals a similar e¤ect
in a game of private information. It is noteworthy, however, and somewhat in contrast to
these complete information studies, that we observe a relatively strong e¤ect, even though
we allow only a very restricted set of messages.
The contribution of our study, hence, is three-fold. First, we compare words and ac-
tions in a game with incomplete information and show that words can be as inuential
as actions. Previous studies comparing words and actions have only considered games of
complete information (Bracht and Feltovich, 2009, Du¤y and Feltovich, 2002 and 2006,
and Wilson and Sell, 1997)6. Second, we slightly extend the reasoning underlying Farrells
neologism-proofness concept, show that it allows us to predict both messages and actions,
and demonstrate that the prediction on which messages will be used is reasonably accurate.
Third, we consider two di¤erent languages. In one case, the informed player can talk about
her private information (returns), in the second case she can talk about her actions. We
show that the language that is available matters for the informed players own contribution.
To the best of our knowledge, especially this latter aspect has remained unexplored in the
literature on private information games7.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we develop the theoretical frame-
work, outlining the equilibria under actions and words. We then describe the experimental
design in Section 3 and move to the results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We study a one-shot public good game with two players, one informed and one uninformed.
The informed player has private information regarding the return of a contribution to the
public good. The contributions return, also called the state, s, can take three di¤erent values
with equal probability, S = fa; b; cg; where a  0; 0 < b < 1 and c > 1. Both the informed
and the uninformed player decide whether to contribute or not to the project, where xi= 1
6Also Brandts and Cooper (2007) compare words to nancial incentives used by a managerin a weak-link
coordination game. Çelen et al (2009) compare advice to observation of others actions in a social learning
environment.
7Some previous studies have focused on the evolution of the strategic meaning of di¤erent sets of messages
(Blume et al, 1998 and 2001, and Agranov and Schotter, 2009).
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indicates a contribution and xi= 0 none, with i = fI; Ug. Whenever convenient, we will
also denote the action of I by x and the action of U by y. The payo¤ function of the game
is given by:
ui = 1  xi + s(xi + vxj); j 6= i; j = fI; Ug
where v > 0. Throughout we assume that a+b+c < 3; b+c > 2 and b > 1=(1+v): These
parameter restrictions imply: (i) against the prior distribution, the uninformed players best
response is not to contribute; (ii) if the uninformed player knows that the state is either
b or c, and considers these to be equally likely, his best response is to contribute; (iii) if
s = a, it is individually optimal and Pareto e¢ cient not to contribute, while when s = c,
the opposite is true; and (iv) it is socially optimal to contribute when the state is b.
Within this context, the baseline game does not allow any information transfer. In
addition, we consider various games that allow signaling by the informed player. Under
Actions, the informed player can signal through her contribution decision. In the case of
Words, she can send a message, either about the state, or about her contribution decision.
We, hence, consider four di¤erent games. In the subsections below we describe the equilibria
of these games. Technical proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2.1 The Baseline Game
Let us rst consider the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game when the uninformed player
receives no signal. The strategy of the informed player is denoted as  = (xa; xb; xc), where
xs denotes the probability of contributing in state s. The strategy of the uninformed player
is specied as  , the probability that he contributes.
Proposition 1 The baseline game has a unique Nash Equilibrium, given by (; ) =
f(0; 0; 1); 0g.
In the unique NE of the game, only the informed player contributes, and then only if
s = c: Since she cannot signal her private information to the uninformed player, the latter
never contributes. However, if he would know that s = c, the uninformed player would
prefer to contribute. Also, when s = b, neither player contributes while total payo¤s would
be maximized if both players did. Signaling the state with either words or actions can
improve upon this outcome.
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2.2 Actions
In the Actionsgame, the informed player chooses her contribution x rst; the uninformed
player observes x and then chooses his contribution y. A strategy  of the informed player
is dened as above. Since the uninformed player can condition his decision on the observed
choice of the other, his strategy space expands. A strategy  of the uninformed player now
is denoted as  = (y0; y1), where yz denotes the probability that the uninformed player
contributes given x = z. The next Proposition states that, if the informed player can signal
the return by revealing her contribution, both her contribution and that of the uninformed
player increase. In particular, a contribution by the informed player is inuential, as it leads
to a contribution of the uninformed player as well.
Proposition 2 The game with Actions has a unique Nash Equilibrium, (; ) = f(0; 1; 1);
(0; 1)g:
Note that signaling with the contribution decision (leading by example) leads to a fully
e¢ cient NE. Players choose x = y = 1 when s = b or s = c, while they choose x = y = 0 if
s = a. This maximizes the sum of payo¤s for each value of s:
2.3 Words
We introduce Wordsby allowing the informed player to send a message m, from a given
set of messages M , to the uninformed player. To allow that some information can indeed
be transmitted, we assume that M contains at least two elements. The informed player
rst selects m, which is observed by the uninformed player before he decides about y. The
uninformed player does not, however, observe x. The payo¤ function remains the same,
hence, communication is costless.
Since the informed player observes the realization of s before sending a message, she
can condition both her message and her contribution on the state of nature. We denote the
strategy of the informed player as  = (a; b; c) where s = (ms; xs). ms is a probability
distribution overM , and xs is the probability of contributing in state s. Similarly  species,
for each m 2 M , the probability y(m) that the uninformed player contributes after the
messagem. We writeMs() for the set of messages inM that occur with positive probability
when the state is s and  is played. Similarly Xs() denotes the set of contributions that
the informed player makes with positive probability when the state is s and  is played.
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Note that, since messages are costless, standard analysis leaves undetermined the messages
that will be used, hence, there will always be multiple Nash equilibria. In Proposition 3,
we, therefore, focus on the equilibrium outcomes: the contribution levels x(s) and y(s) in
each state s.
There are two pure strategy equilibrium outcomes. In the equilibria of the rst type,
communication is uninformative, viewed as pure cheap talk, so that contribution levels are
the same as in the baseline game. In the equilibria of the second type, the informed players
messages are inuential, i.e. they induce the uninformed player to contribute when the state
is b or c, but not when the state is a. In these equilibria, the informed player only contributes
when s = c, hence, she free rides when s = b. We call these inuentialequilibria.8
Proposition 3 There are two pure strategy equilibrium outcomes in the game with Words,
given by, respectively:
(1) X() = (Xa(); Xb(); Xc()) = (0; 0; 1) and
(m) = 0 for all m 2Ms(); where s = fa; b; cg
(2) X() = (Xa(); Xb(); Xc()) = (0; 0; 1) and
(m) = 0 for all m 2Ma();while (m) = 1 for all m 2M b() [M c()
Introducing words can, hence, have two e¤ects on contribution levels: a positive one,
which increases the uninformed players contribution levels, but not those of the informed
player, or a null-e¤ect, which leaves contribution levels as in the baseline case.
2.3.1 Words with a focal meaning: neologism-proof equilibrium
In this subsection, we show that only an inuential equilibrium is neologism-proof, as dened
in Farrell (1993). We also discuss why we consider this concept to be relevant in our context.
Thus far, we left the message space M to be an abstract set, and just assumed it to be
large enough for partial separation. The existing game theoretic literature on cheap talk
can be divided into two classes. Most papers have assumed that messages do not have an
a priori meaning, but that they may acquire a meaning through their use in equilibrium.
Starting from Farrell (1985, 1993), there is a smaller literature that assumes that players
8There are also equilibria in which the informed player randomizes over messages, but these still yield the
same contribution levels. If a=0, then there are also other mixed strategy equilibria in which some messages
are used in all states of nature by the informed player; see the proof (in the Appendix) for details. We will
focus on the pure strategy equilibria.
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share a common language, in which messages have a natural, focal meaning. In this setting,
although messages do not need to be believed, they will be understood. The idea is that,
in such a context, players cannot (or will not) fully neglect the meaning that a message
has outside of the specic game under consideration. In his seminal papers, Farrell has
shown that, under this assumption, some equilibria are no longer plausible, since they can
be destabilized by reference to the focal meaning of the messages; formally they are not
neologism-proof. In the experiments that we conducted, see the next section, we used
messages that have a literal meaning; hence, our work is in this second tradition. We will
show that only an inuential equilibrium is neologism-proof9.
Strictly speaking, however, there are two reasons why the neologism-proofness concept is
not directly applicable to our context. First, our public goods game with Wordsis not of the
type that has been considered in the traditional cheap talk literature, as it is a game with
private information in which both players take payo¤-relevant actions. Nevertheless, the
informed player, I, has a strictly dominant contribution level xI(s), in each state of nature
s. If we assume that I will always choose this contribution, we are back in the standard
setting, to which Farrells ideas can be applied10. Second, and perhaps more important,
the interpretation of Farrells concept relies on the players having a rich language at their
disposal. In our experiments, we used a restricted language. We return to this aspect after
having given the formal denition and having formulated the result.
For a subset T of S write bU (T ) for the best response of player U , given the prior, but
conditional on the state s being in T . Let e = (; ) be an equilibrium and denote by ueI(s)
the equilibrium payo¤ of player I, given that the state is s. Farrell (1993) denes the set T
to be self-signaling with respect to e if
T = fs 2 S : uI(s; bU (T )) > ueI(s)g
9Rabin (1990) has argued that Farrells denition rules out too many equilibrium outcomes. For further
discussion, see also Farrell and Rabin (1996). It can, however, be shown that, if a<0, only the inuential
equilibrium satises Rabins condition of Credible Message Rationalizability. If a=0, player I is indi¤erent
between all responses of player U and also the uninuential equilibrium satises CMR. If I would have social
preferences and attach some positive weight to the utility of U , then I strictly prefers U to choose y=0 if
a=0, and in this case again only the inuential equilibrium is CMR. Details are available from the authors
upon request.
10 It is innocuous to make this assumption as also the best reply of the uninformed player only depends on
the posterior distribution over the states and not on the contributions that player I makes.
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and he denes the equilibrium e to be neologism-proof if there is no set of types T
that is self-signaling with respect to it. The interpretation is as follows. Suppose e is the
equilibrium under consideration, and suppose that player I says the state belongs to the
set T. If player U interprets the message literally, he will be inclined to choose bU (T ). On
the other hand, player U should not be credulous, but rather ask himself the question: when
does player I have an incentive to use this message, assuming that it would be believed? If
T is self-signaling, player I strictly benets from using the message the state is in Texactly
when this statement is true. When T is self-signaling, there are good arguments to believe
this message as the literal meaning of the message the state is in Tis consistent with the
incentives that the game provides. Consequently, if an equilibrium e is not neologism-proof,
and the language that is available to the players is rich enough to allow a self-signaling set
to identify itself, e can be upset by the corresponding self-signaling message. We have
Proposition 4 Only an inuential equilibrium is neologism-proof.
The proof relies on the fact that the set T = fb; cg is self-signaling. If the informed
player uses the message "the state is b or c", the uninformed player should thus believe her.
Farrell (1993) assumes that players have a rich natural language at their disposal, so that
this message is available. In our experiments, although we used messages with a natural
meaning, we did not use a rich language. In particular, in none of the two games that we
experimented with was the message the state is b or cavailable. Nevertheless, in each of
these games, there were messages (such as "the state is c" or "I contribute") available, that
could naturally be interpreted like this. In other words, the self-signaling set fb; cg might
be able to signal through a di¤erent message than the state is in fb; cg. Furthermore,
although the interpretation of Farrells concept relies on this richness assumption, the formal
denition only refers to the mathematical structure of the game under consideration. For
both of these reasons, we believe that the concept is relevant to our game.
It should be noted that, although the concept of neologism-proofness limits the number
of equilibrium outcomes to one, it does not lead to restrictions on the messages that will be
used. As already mentioned in the context of Proposition 3, there are multiple equilibria.
For example, consider the case discussed in the Introduction, where there are (at least) the
messages B (Bad) and G (Good). In this case, in one neologism-proof equilibrium, player
I sends the message B when s = b, or s = c, to which player U responds with y = 1, while
player I uses the message G when s = a, which is then followed by the response y = 0.
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In another equilibrium, player I sends the message G if s = b, or s = c, (with response y
= 1), while the message is B if s = a (with response y = 0). Formally, according to the
logic of the concept, both of these equilibria are neologism-proof. Nevertheless, the latter
equilibrium seems more natural than the rst. After all, in this latter equilibrium, player I
communicates that the state is Bad exactly when this is the case, while she communicates
that the state is G, when it is not bad. In other words, the latter equilibrium is closer to
the truth than the former.
2.3.2 Talking about the state or talking about the contributions
To further develop the above idea, let us now focus on the two specic message sets that
will be discussed in the remainder of this paper. In the rst case, M= M s = fa; b; cg, so
that messages correspond to the state of nature11. In the second case, M = Mx =fx = 1,
x = 0g, the messages correspond to the contribution decision of the informed player. To
select among the equilibria, hence, to also pin down the messages that will be used, we
make two assumptions, each of them corroborated by extensive experimental evidence. The
rst assumption is that players (or at least some of them) have at least a minimal aversion
to lying. Several experiments (e.g. Gneezy, 2005, Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 2007, and
Hurkens and Kartik, 2009) have shown that players dislike lying. As in Demichelis and
Weibull (2009), we adopt a very minimal version of this idea, namely that, when the material
payo¤s are the same, players prefer not to lie12.
This assumption is su¢ cient to obtain a unique, focal, equilibrium in the case where
messages are about the contribution of the informed player, Mx =fx = 1, x = 0g. In this
case, there are two pure equilibria that produce the inuential equilibrium outcome. In the
rst, I sends the message x = 0 when s = a and the message x = 1 when s = b, c. In the
second, messages are reversed: I says x = 1 when s = a and says x = 0 when s = b, c. In
the rst equilibrium, I tells the truth when s=a and c; in the second, she always lies. We
11We chose this set of messages because it is precise and corresponds directly to the informed players
private information. In Serra-Garcia et al (2008) we consider a richer set of messages allowing for two or
more states to be stated in one message and a blank message. In that paper, the action of the informed
player is observed by the uninformed player as well as the informed players message. We nd that players
contribution behavior is not signicantly a¤ected by the richer message space, but that informed players are
often vague.
12We note that Farrell (1993, p. 519) also explicitly refers to players having a slight preference for telling
the truth in order to justify his renement of neologism-proofness.
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consider the rst equilibrium to be focal.
Now consider the case in which player I can talk about the state, but is required to pro-
vide full (precise) information,M s = fa; b; cg: Table 1 describes the 6 message combinations
that are possible in the various inuential pure equilibria.
Message sent if state
Equilibrium nr. a b c # states lie
1 a b b 1
2 a c c 1
3 b a a 3
4 b c c 2
5 c a a 3
6 c b b 2
Table 1: Message use in inuential equilibria and lies
An argument as above points in the direction of the rst or the second equilibrium,
but it does not discriminate between those. Nevertheless, we argue that only the second
equilibrium is focal. The additional assumption leading to this conclusion is that a small but
positive portion of uninformed players is naïve and interprets messages literally and naïvely.
Such an assumption is also used in Crawford (2003), Kartik et al (2007) and Ellingsen
and Östling (2009). Experiments have indeed shown that some receivers are credulous and
interpret messages literally and naïvely (e.g. Cai and Wang, 2006). Under this additional
assumption, only the second equilibrium is focal. Since player I wants to induce U to
contribute when the state is b or c, and U might interpret messages literally, I uses message
c. He assumes that U will react to the unused message b by interpreting it literally and,
hence, by not contributing. Note that the natural language reinforces the equilibrium. For
this reason we call this equilibrium focal.
We have proved:
Proposition 5 The games with words M s and Mx each have a unique focal equilibrium.
The focal equilibrium is inuential. If player I talks about the state, she will reveal it when
it is a, whilst she will say c when the state is b or c. Alternatively, when player I talks about
her contribution, she will honestly reveal her contribution when the state is a or c, but she
will lie and say that she contributes in state b. Player I only contributes when the state is
c, and player U only does so after message c or after a message stating that I contributes.
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3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
3.1 Parametrization and Treatments
In the experiment, the payo¤ function of our game is the following, ui = 40[1  xi + s(xi +
vxj)], where s = f0; 0:75; 1:5g and v = 2. Subjects are asked to choose between A (equivalent
to xi = 0) and B (equivalent to xi = 1) in each round. The payo¤s of a player depend on
her choice, the choice of the other player and the earnings table selected. The earnings table
number (1,2 or 3) corresponds to the value of s (s = 0, 0.75 or 1.5, respectively). Payo¤s
(in points) are shown in Table 2 for each earnings table number. These tables were shown
to subjects both in the instructions (reproduced in the supplementary material13) as well
as on the computer screens.
Earnings Table 1 Earnings Table 2 Earnings Table 3
Other persons choice Other persons choice Other persons choice
A B A B A B
Your choice A 40 40 A 40 100 A 40 160
B 0 0 B 30 90 B 60 180
Table 2: Payo¤ Matrices
In all treatments, at the beginning of each round, the informed player, named rst
mover in the experiment, is informed about the earnings table selected, and next decides
whether to contribute or not. In the Baseline, the uninformed player, named second mover,
receives no information and is simply asked to make a decision. In Words and Actions,
the uninformed player rst receives the signal from the informed player and is then asked
to make a decision. In Actions, the signal is the decision of the informed player (A or
B). In Words, the informed player is explicitly asked to also select a message to send to
the uninformed player. In Words(s), the three possible messages are The earnings table
selected by the computer is s, where s is either 1, 2 or 3. In this game, the informed player
thus talks about the state. In Words(x), two messages are possible: I choose Aor I choose
B. In this game, the informed player thus talks about (her) contributions. The roles of
informed and uninformed player are randomly determined within each pair in each round.
The information available in each treatment is detailed in Table 3 below.
13The supplementary material can be downloaded at http://center.uvt.nl/phd_stud/garcia/WWB.rar.
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Informed player Uninformed player
Baseline Observes s No information
Words(s) Observes s Observes m 2M s
Words(x) Observes s Observes m 2Mx
Actions Observes s Observes x
Table 3: Experimental Design - Information Structure by Treatment
In each period, both players have a history table at the bottom of their screens, displaying
the following information for each previous period: the earnings table selected, the role of
the player, the own decision and that of the other player, including the message sent if
applicable, and the earnings of both players. From this information, players could not
identify the players with whom they had previously played.
3.2 Hypotheses
We take the results from Propositions 1 to 5 and summarize the equilibrium contributions
of the di¤erent treatments in Table 4, below. The informed player never contributes when
s=0, and always does when s=1.5. When s=0.75, she only does in Actions, that is, if
her contribution is observed. The reactions of the uninformed player range from never
contributing (as in Base) to imitating the informed player (in Actions).
Choicesa
Treatment s=0 s=0.75 s=1.5
Baseline (0; 0) (0; 0) (1; 0)
Words (0; 0) (0; 1) (1; 1)
Actions (0; 0) (1; 1) (1; 1)
Note: a(x; y)
Table 4: Expected Choices
The hypotheses 1 and 3 are derived from the contribution behavior of both players as
described in this table. Hypothesis 2 focuses on the communication between the players
and is derived from Proposition 5. Relatedly, the e¢ ciency14 () of each treatment can
be ranked as follows: Base (61:3%)  Words(s) and (x)(91:9%) < Actions = (100%):These
14E¢ ciency is calculated throughout the paper as the sum of payo¤s of the leader and the follower in each
treatment, divided by the maximum sum of payo¤s attainable.
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inequalities lead to hypothesis 415.
Hypothesis 1 (informed player contribution behavior): when s=0.75, the informed
player contributes:
(a) more frequently under Actions than in Words(s) or in Words(x)
(b) with equal frequency in Words(s) as in Words(x).
Hypothesis 2 (message use and information transmission):
(a) if s=0, the message the state is 0is used in Words(s), whilst the message I do
not contributeis used in Words(x). If s=0.75 or s=1.5, the messages that are used are the
state is 1.5and I contribute, respectively.
(b) the same information is transmitted in Words(s), Words(x) and Actions.
Hypothesis 3 (uninformed player contribution behavior): the messages the state
is 1.5 and I contribute, in Words(s) and Words(x), respectively, are as inuential as a
contribution is in Actions.
Hypothesis 4 (e¢ ciency):
(a) e¢ ciency is highest under Actions, compared to all other treatments.
(b) e¢ ciency under Words(s) is equal to that under Words(x).
3.3 Experimental Procedures
Four matching groups (of 8 subjects each) participated in each treatment. Subjects were re-
paired every period with another subject in their matching group and roles were randomly
assigned. To have enough learning possibilities for each earnings table (value of s), subjects
played the game for 21 periods. Further, since there were 8 subjects in each matching group,
each subject met the same person at most 3 times, without coinciding two consecutive
periods in the same role. Overall, 84 pairings were obtained per matching group (4 pairs x
21 periods): 25 faced Earnings Table 1, 30 Earnings Table 2 and 29 Earnings Table 316. The
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
It was conducted in CentERlab, at Tilburg University. Subjects received an invitation to
15We do not formulate a hypothesis about payo¤s since the treatment e¤ects are expected to be small for
the informed players payo¤s. We briey discuss predicted and actual payo¤s in Section 4.4.
16The matching schemes, roles and states of nature for each period and pair were randomly drawn before
the experiment. This allowed us to have the same exact patterns across di¤erent matching groups.
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participate in the experiment via e-mail. They could enrol online to the session of the
experiment, which was most convenient for them, subject to availability of places. Subjects
were paid their accumulated earnings in cash and in private at the end of the experiment.
Average earnings were 12.20 Euro (sd: 2.46) and sessions lasted approximately 60 minutes.
4 Results
We report results from the second half of our experiment (periods 11 to 21). This is moti-
vated by the fact that, in the rst 10 periods, informed players exhibit strong learning for
s=0.75. Our unit of observation will be each matching group in the experiment; we thus
have 4 independent observations per treatment17.
4.1 Contributions by the informed player
The informed players contribution decision is determined by two main factors. The rst
one is the state, s, and the second one is the treatment. In Figure 1, we observe the average









































Baseline Actions Words (s) Words (x)
Figure 1: Contribution Frequency by Informed Player, by
State and Treatment
The four leftmost columns of Figure 1 reveal that, when s = 0, the informed player
contributes between 0 and 4% of the time. In contrast, when s = 1:5 (four rightmost
17The z-tree code, raw data and stata code are provided in the supplementary material.
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columns), she contributes approximately 90% of the time. In neither of these cases is there
a signicant di¤erence across treatments (Kruskall-Wallis test, p-value=0.1718 and 0.8152,
respectively).
Treatment di¤erences become signicant when s = 0:75. First, the informed player con-
tributes signicantly more often (81% of the time) in the Actions treatment, when her contri-
bution is observed, than in any other treatment (Mann-Whitney (MW) test, p-value=0.0194
comparing Actions to Baseline, or Actions and Words(s); p-value=0.0202 comparing Actions
and Words(x)).
The informed players contribution is also a¤ected by the words she can use. When the
informed player talks about her contribution decision, her contribution frequency increases
to 32%, compared to 6%, when she talks about the state (MW test, p-value=0.0421).
Result 1 (contributions of the informed player):
(a) When s = 0:75, the informed players contribution is higher in Actions than in
Words(s) and in Words(x). Thus, we do not reject Hypothesis 1 (a).
(b) The contribution frequency of the informed player is also a¤ected by the language
that is available. The informed player contributes more often when sending messages about
her contribution (Words(x)), than when she sends messages about the state (Words(s)).
We, thus, reject Hypothesis 1 (b).
In contrast to what standard theory predicts, it, hence, matters what the informed player
can talk about. We will examine this result in more detail at the end of this section, after
having studied the use of messages by the informed player, the information transmitted
through these messages, and the reaction of the uninformed player.
4.2 Message use and information transmission
In Table 5, we display the informed players message use in Words(s) and Words(x). The
rows display the possible messages and the columns the frequencies with which they are
used in the various states. For example, in treatment Words(s), the message the state is 0
is used 71.1% of the time when s = 0.
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Message usea
Treatment Message (m) s=0 s=0.75 s=1.5
Words(s)
The state is 0 71.1% 8.8% 1.8%
The state is 0.75 11.6% 16.2% 3.6%
The state is 1.5 17.3% 75.0% 94.7%
Words(x)
a) Matching groups 13,15 and 16
I do not contribute 94.9% 23.5% 9.5%
I contribute 5.1% 76.5% 90.5%
b) Matching group 14
I do not contribute 61.5% 17.6% 28.6%
I contribute 38.5% 82.4% 71.4%
Note: a Number of times m is sent over total number of times that s is drawn
Table 5: Message use in Words(s) and Words(x), by treatment and state
Let us rst focus on the Words(s) treatment. When s = 0, informed players most fre-
quently use the message the state is 0 (71.1%). Instead when s = 0:75 or s = 1:5, the
informed player most frequently uses the message the state is 1.5(75% and 94.7%, respec-
tively). The frequency with which this message is used in these states is not signicantly
di¤erent (Wilcoxon signed-rank (WSR) test, p-value=0.1441). Note that, when s = 0 or
s = 1:5, the informed player most frequently tells the truth, but that, when s = 0:75, lies
are very frequent. In any case, the natural meaning of the words plays a role.
Let us now turn to Words(x). In this treatment, we observe di¤erences in message use
across matching groups. Three matching groups (the groups 13, 15 and 16), use messages
as expected in the focal equilibrium, while one matching group (group 14) does not. In this
matching group, when s = 0, the message I contributeis sent much more frequently than
in any other matching group (38.5%, versus 0% in matching group 13, or 7.7% in groups
15 and 16). Furthermore, in this group 14, the message I contributealso is used more
often when s = 0:75 than when s = 1:5. We nd that this di¤erence in message use in
matching group 14 has important consequences in terms of the information transmitted by
the informed player. In the tables that follow, we therefore report separate statistics for this
group18.
18 In treatment Words(s) we nd no substantial di¤erences across matching groups and, therefore, report
averages across all matching groups throughout.
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In matching groups 13, 15 and 16, when s = 0, the informed player most frequently says
I do not contribute (94.9%). When s = 0:75 or s = 1:5, she most frequently sends the
message I contribute(76.5% and 90.5%). Again, the frequency with which she sends this
message does not di¤er signicantly between these two states (WSR test, p-value= 0.2850).
We also here see that the natural meaning of the message plays a role.
To consider the information transmitted in Actions, Words(s) and Words(x), we now
take the behavior of the informed player during periods 11 to 21 and calculate (using Bayes
rule) the posterior probability that the state is s, given the signal received. Table 6 displays
the results. The rows represent the di¤erent signals (distinguished also by matching group
in the case of Words(x)), while the nal three columns give the posterior probability of each
state.
Probability that
Treatment Signal s=0 s=0.75 s=1.5
Actions Informed players decision
x=0 0.75 0.18 0.06
x=1 0.02 0.5 0.48
Words(s) Message about the state
The state is 0 0.85 0.13 0.02
The state is 0.75 0.18 0.54 0.28
The state is 1.5 0.07 0.44 0.48
Words(x) Message about the contribution
a) Matching groups 13,15 and 16
I do not contribute 0.70 0.23 0.07
I contribute 0.03 0.49 0.48
b) Matching group 14
I do not contribute 0.53 0.20 0.27
I contribute 0.17 0.48 0.35
Table 6: Posterior probability of each state conditional on signal by informed player
In Actions, after a contribution (x = 1), the probability that s = 0:75 is 0.5, while the
probability that s = 1:5 is 0.48. Instead, if the informed player does not contribute, the
probability that s = 0 is 0.75.
In Words(s), after the message the state is 1.5the probability that s = 0:75 is 0.44.
This probability is not signicantly di¤erent from the corresponding probability, 0.5, after
a contribution in Actions (MW test, p-value=0.1489). The probability that s = 1:5 is 0.48,
which again is not signicantly di¤erent from that after a contribution in Actions (MW test,
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p-value=1.000). This message therefore did not transmit signicantly di¤erent information
than a contribution decision of the informed player, in Actions. Furthermore, the probability
that s = 0 after the message the state is 0(0.85) is not signicantly di¤erent from that
(0.75) after no contribution by the informed player in Actions (MW test, p-value=0.2482).
In the treatment Words(x), for matching groups 13, 15 and 16, after a message I con-
tribute, the probability that s = 0:75 is 0.49, and that of s = 1:5 is 0.48. These are not
signicantly di¤erent to those after a contribution in the Actions treatment (MW test, p-
value=0.5637 for state 0.75 and 0.4678 for state 1.5). Furthermore, again excluding matching
group 14, the probability that s = 0 after the message I do not contribute(0.70, ) is not
signicantly di¤erent from that (0.75) after no contribution in Actions (MW test, p-value
0.1102). Instead, for matching group 14, the probability that s = 1:5, after the message I
contributeis 0.35.
Result 2 (message use and information transmission):
(a) In Words(s), the message the state is 0is most frequently used when s=0, while
the message the state is 1.5is most frequently used when s=0.75 or 1.5. In Words(x), I
do not contributeis most frequently used when s=0, and I contributeis used most often
when s=0.75 or 1.5 (especially in matching groups 13, 15 and 16). We therefore do not
reject Hypothesis 2a.
(b) Compared to a contribution decision in Actions, the message the state is 1.5
in Words(s), or the message I contributein Words(x) (except in one matching group) does
not convey signicantly di¤erent information. Compared to no contribution in Actions, the
messages the state is 0and I do not contributealso do not convey signicantly di¤erent
information. Thus, we do not reject Hypothesis 2b.
4.3 Contributions by the uninformed player
The uninformed player reacts to the information transmitted by the informed player. In
Table 7, rows again display the di¤erent possible signals. Column (1) gives the average con-
tribution frequency of the uninformed player. Columns (2) and (3) give the expected payo¤
in points from not contributing, or contributing, calculated using the posterior probabilities
displayed in Table 6, as well as (for Words(s) and Words(x)), the frequency with which the
informed player contributes conditional on each message sent. The last column of Table 7,
(4), displays the empirical best reply, based on the expected payo¤ calculation. The choice
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with the highest expected payo¤ is then displayed for each signal.
In the baseline treatment, the rst row in Table 7, the uninformed player receives no
signal but contributes 39.2% of the time. This is an unexpectedly high level of contributions,
since the empirical best reply is not to contribute. This contribution rate is, however, similar
to that in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), who nd that 35% of sellers invest when there
is no communication, despite the prediction of no investment. One possible explanation in
our game is that individuals try to guesswhen the state will be high and that they fall
prey of the gamblers fallacy(Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). For example, the likelihood
of a contribution decreases in the period after the state was 1.5, despite the fact that players
are informed that in every period the state is 0, 0.75 or 1.5 with equal probability. Another
possible explanation is that social preferences play a role. After all, with an expected value
of s of 0.75 it is socially e¢ cient to contribute.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uninformed Players Expected Payo¤s Empirical
Treatment Signal Contribution Frequency (y=0) (y=1) best reply
Baseline - 39.2% 81.22 71.22 y=0
Actions x=0 4.4% 40.00 9.27 y=0
x=1 88.0% 127.77 131.65 y=1
Words(s) The state is 0 2.3% 43.67 8.60 y=0
The state is 0.75 42.0% 71.67 64.69 y=0
The state is 1.5 69.7% 93.30 95.51 y=1
Words(x)
a) Matching groups 13,15,16
I do not contribute 7.6% 53.40 24.67 y=0
I contribute 62.3% 109.69 113.35 y=1
b) Matching group 14
I do not contribute 13.3% 52.00 34.00 y=0
I contribute 13.8% 71.03 66.21 y=0
Table 7: Uninformed players contribution frequency, expected payo¤s and best reply, by
treatment
In the treatments where signals are received, the uninformed player responds optimally
to signals in most cases. In Actions, after observing a contribution by the informed player,
the uninformed player contributes 88% of the time. This is the choice that yields the highest
expected payo¤ (131.65>127.77), and thus it is also the empirical best reply. In Words(s),
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after a message the state is 1.5, the uninformed player contributes 69.7% of the time, which
again is also his best reply.
In Words(x) and for matching groups 13, 15 and 16, the uninformed player contributes
62.3% of the time after message I contribute, which is also his best reply. Interestingly, for
matching group 14, the uninformed player rarely contributes after a message I contribute
(only 13.8%). This is his empirical best reply, as can be seen by comparing 71.03 to 66.21.
This is mainly driven by the informed players use of message I contributewhen the state
is 0 in 38.5% of the cases (as shown in Table 5).
Uninformed player contributions in Actions are very similar to those in the treatments
Words(s) and Words(x). If we compare the reaction to a contribution of the informed
player in Actions to the reaction to the message the state is 1.5, we nd that these are
not signicantly di¤erent (MW test, p-value=0.1489). If we compare that reaction to a
contribution (88%) to the reaction to the message I contribute(62.3%), we nd that the
di¤erence is only marginally signicant (MW test, p-value=0.0771). Finally, comparing the
reaction to the message the state is 1.5to the message I contribute, we nd no signicant
di¤erences (MW test, p-value=0.7237). This leads to Result 3.
Result 3 (contributions of the uninformed player):
The uninformed player frequently contributes (more than 60% of the time) after observ-
ing the contribution of the informed player, or after hearing the message the state is 1.5, or
after the message I contribute. Furthermore, the reaction to the state is 1.5is not signif-
icantly di¤erent from the reaction after observing a contribution, while the reaction to the
message I contributeis only marginally di¤erent from that after observing a contribution
(except for one matching group). Thus, the messages the state is 1.5and I contributeare
as inuential as actions, and we do not reject Hypothesis 3.
4.4 Payo¤s and E¢ ciency
In Table 8 below we display average payo¤s and e¢ ciency by treatment. We also display
the predicted average payo¤s and e¢ ciency in equilibrium.
Table 8 reveals that the informed player does remarkably well in the baseline treatment,
compared to the theoretical prediction. This is due to the fact that the uninformed player
contributes more frequently than predicted. In contrast, under Actions, Words(s) and (x),
the informed player does worse as predicted, while the uninformed players payo¤ comes
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close to the theoretical prediction in most cases. Interestingly, the uninformed players
payo¤ is signicantly higher in matching groups 13, 15 and 16 in Words(x) compared to
Words(s), while the informed players payo¤ su¤ers a slight (non-signicant) decrease (MW
test, p-value=0.0339 and 0.4795, respectively). These changes reveal that the decrease in
free-riding by the informed player in Words(x) has important e¤ects, particularly for the
uninformed player.
Taking both the informed and uninformed players payo¤, we can calculate e¢ ciency.
Table 8 shows that e¢ ciency is highest in Actions (89.1%), and that it is signicantly
higher there than in Words(s) and Words(x), where it is 76.1% and 78.6% respectively (MW
test, comparing Actions and Words(s), p-value=0.0209, comparing Actions and Words(x)
in matching groups 13, 15 and 16, p-value=0.0497). Thus, we nd that, as predicted,
Actions leads to the most e¢ cient outcome. If we compare e¢ ciency between Words(s) and
Words(x), we do not nd a signicant di¤erence (MW test, p-value=0.4795).
Informed players Uninformed players E¢ ciency
average payo¤ average payo¤
Treatment Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
Baseline 73.24 46.36 78.01 78.18 72.8% 61.0%
(1.97) (2.25) (0.02)
Actions 89.72 103.86 95.40 103.86 89.1% 100.0%
(2.74) (3.30) (0.02)
Words(s) 83.30 107.73 74.83 80.68 76.1% 91.9%
(11.93) (4.20) (0.06)
Words(x)
a) Matching groups 13,15,16 76.06 107.73 87.12 80.68 78.6% 91.9%
(14.45) (3.29) (0.05)
b) Matching group 14 51.36 107.73 63.18 80.68 55.1% 91.9%
Note: standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 8: Average Payo¤s and E¢ ciency, by treatment
Result 4 (e¢ ciency):
(a) E¢ ciency is highest under Actions, as predicted. We therefore do not reject
Hypothesis 4 (a).
(b) E¢ ciency is not signicantly di¤erent in Words(s) and Words(x). We therefore
do not reject Hypothesis 4 (b).
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4.5 Discussion: messages and contributions by the informed player
All in all, the theoretical predictions from Section 2 organize the data very well. As we,
however, have seen at the beginning of this section, hypothesis 1 (b) is rejected: when the
informed player talks about her contribution, she contributes more often than when she
talks about the returns to the contribution. Our objective here is to discuss this result in
somewhat greater detail.
We display in Table 9, in the rows labeled Contribution Freq, the contribution frequencies
by the informed player, conditional on the state and the message that she sends. For
completeness, this table also displays, in the rows labeled Message Freq, the frequency with
which each message is used. This latter information was already been displayed in Table 5.
State
Treatment Message (m) s=0 s=0.75 s=1.5
Words(s) The state is 0 Contribution Freqa. 0.0% 16.7% 100.0%
Message Freqb. 71.1% 8.8% 1.8%
The state is 0.75 Contribution Freq. 0.0% 6.7% 50.0%
Message Freq. 11.6% 16.2% 3.6%
The state is 1.5 Contribution Freq. 0.0% 4.1% 90.7%
Message Freq. 17.3% 75.0% 94.7%
Words(x)
a) Matching groups 13,15 and 16
I do not contribute Contribution Freq. 2.8% 23.3% 100.0%
Message Freq. 94.9% 23.5% 9.5%
I contribute Contribution Freq. 50.0% 41.2% 100.0%
Message Freq. 5.1% 76.5% 90.5%
b) Matching group 14
I do not contribute Contribution Freq. 0.0% 33.3% 25.0%
Message Freq. 61.5% 17.6% 28.6%
I contribute Contribution Freq. 0.0% 7.1% 70.0%
Message Freq. 38.5% 82.4% 71.4%
Note:a Number of times the informed player contributes and sends m over total number of times m is sent,
by state;b Number of times m is sent over total number of times that s is drawn.
Table 9: Contribution frequency by the informed player, conditional on the message sent,
and message use
Let us focus on the case s = 0:75 and the focal equilibrium. In Words(s), the informed
player sends the message the state is 1.5 in 75% of the cases, and, in such case, she
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very rarely contributes (only in 4.1% of the cases), as shown in bold. In particular, the
informed player lies frequently. Let us contrast this with the behavior in the matching
groups 13, 15 and 16 in the Words(x) treatment. First of all, when s = 0:75, the informed
player frequently states that she contributes (76.5%). However, conditional on sending the
message I contribute, she indeed contributes in 41.2% of the cases. Hence, when s=0.75,
the informed player contributes more often conditional on saying I contributeas compared
to when saying the state is 1.5 (MW test, p-value=0.0745). In contrast, conditional on
sending the message I do not contributeor the state is 0, contributions are not signicantly
di¤erent (MW test, p-value=0.6374).
This di¤erence in behavior across messages I contributeand the state is 1.5 is not
driven by di¤erences in the informativeness of the messages, as we saw in section 4.2, or in
the reactions of the uninformed player, as we saw in section 4.3.
We suggest two explanations for this result, both relying on the idea that players may
dislike lying. Existing research has shown that often individuals indeed have an aversion
to lying about private information (e.g., Gneezy, 2005) or about intended actions (e.g.,
Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004), and that the extent of lying may depend on the costs
and benets involved.
Let us rst assume that players dislike lying as such. Formally, assume that the informed
players utility not only depends on her own material payo¤ but that she also su¤ers a
disutility of c, when sending a message which is not true. Kartik (2009) follows this approach,
which we simplify greatly here19. We will argue that it is less costly to avoid lying when
the informed player talks about her contribution than when she talks about the state.
Again, suppose s=0.75 and that we are in the focal equilibrium. When words are about
the state and the informed player says the state is 1.5, her utility is uI(x=0,the state
is 1.5,y=1)=100-c. In contrast, if she deviates and tells the truth about the state, she
can expect the uninformed player not to contribute, hence, her utility will only be 40.
Consequently, a lie brings considerable benets. Only when the cost of lying is high, if
c  60, will the informed player say the state is 0.75.
Now consider the situation in which the informed player talks about her contribution.
As in the previous case, if she says I contribute but does not, her utility is 100-c. If,
instead, she says I do not contribute, her payo¤ drops to 40. However, in contrast to the
previous case, the informed player can protect herself against this drop in payo¤ by saying
19A similar approach is used in Kartik et al (2007), Chen et al (2008) and Chen (2009).
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I contributeand choosing to indeed contribute. In this case, her payo¤ drops to 90, but
she avoids the lie. For players that dislike lying somewhat, but not too much (10<c<60),
this combination is the preferred one. In other words, players who dislike lying somewhat,
but not too much, will choose to contribute in state s=0.75 and announce to do so, while
they will choose to report s=1.5 in that state and to not contribute. Note that, if the
informed player talks about the state, there is no cheap way to avoid the lie: even if she
would contribute, she would still lie. This may explain why the level of free-riding depends
on the language available.
The second explanation is based on the assumption that the informed player may have
a taste for keeping her word. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) and Miettinen (2008)
proposed models in which players su¤er a disutility if they do not act as they announced
or promised to do, and Vanberg (2008) provided evidence that people have a preference for
keeping promises per se20. Now, in our game, there are no explicit promises, but saying I
contributeis somewhat similar to making a promise, while, in contrast, saying the state is
1.5clearly is not. If individuals dislike breaking promises, they might be willing to forgo
monetary payo¤s in order to avoid breaking a promise, but not when talking about the
state. To a certain extent, this explanation thus relies on the assumption that lying about
intentions is perceived as being more costly than lying about a more neutral aspect, such
as the state of nature.
The reader might wonder whether also guilt aversion (Batigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007)
could not explain the di¤erence in behavior across the two languages. According to this
theory, an individual su¤ers a disutility when she lets another player down. In order to
avoid this disutility or guilt, an individual might act according to what he believes others
expect him to do (see Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006, Vanberg, 2008, and Ellingsen et al,
2009, for experimental tests of this theory, with the latter two papers arguing that guilt
aversion may be less prominent than previously thought). Thus, if the informed player
makes a promise and others expect her to keep it, she might keep it to avoid guilt. This
theory, however, does not predict a priori that messages I contribute and the state is
20 Interestingly, existing studies on games with complete information show mixed results when communica-
tion about intentions is restricted, as in our case, to pre-formulated messages. Such restricted communication
does not increase cooperation or trust in some studies (e.g. Bochet et al, 2006, and Charness and Dufwen-
berg, 2010), while it does in others (e.g. Du¤y and Feltovich, 2002). See Balliet (2010) for meta-analysis, as
well as the reviews by Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007) and Koukoumelis et al (2009), and the references therein.
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1.5generate di¤erent beliefs regarding what the uninformed player expects, while also the
realized equilibrium payo¤ is the same in both cases (and equal to 30 in case of earnings
table 2), so that the extent of letting the other down also is the same. It follows that guilt
aversion does not imply a di¤erent behavior of the informed player across languages.
5 Conclusion
In the context of a two-player, one-shot, public good game in which only one player is
informed about the return from contributing, we have compared signaling by words and
actions. Using actions, the informed player reveals her contribution decision to the unin-
formed before the latter decides on his contribution. Using words, the informed player sends
(cheap talk) messages, either about the return or about her contribution decision, before
the other player decides on his contribution. We compare these signaling devices using also
a baseline game in which no signaling is available.
From a theoretical perspective, by using actions, fully e¢ cient contribution levels can
be achieved. In the experiment, we nd that contribution levels are indeed most e¢ cient
using this kind of signal. This result is in line with that of Potters et al (2007).
According to standard theory, whether messages are about the return, or about the
contribution, is irrelevant. By allowing cheap talk, two Nash equilibrium outcomes be-
come possible, but only one of these is neologism-proof. In this equilibrium, by using the
appropriate words, the informed player can elicit the uninformed players contribution. Con-
sequently, words can be as inuential as actions. However, cheap talkhas a dark side: it
allows the informed player to free-ride on the contribution of the uninformed one.
Our experiment shows that words can indeed be as inuential as actions. In most match-
ing groups, messages are informative, as much as contribution decisions. And uninformed
players react to the messages the state is 1.5 or I contribute in a similar way as to a
contribution decision. Broadly, the messages used in the experiment are also in line with
what (our slight renement of) neologism-proofness predicts.
In sharp contrast to the standard theoretical prediction, however, we nd that it matters
whether messages are about the return to the public good, or about the contribution of the
informed player. Informed players contribute more often when saying I contribute, than
when saying the return is 1.5. Two possible explanations for this anomalywere advanced
in this paper: aversion to lying (coupled with the fact that it is less costly to avoid lies
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about contribution levels) and an intrinsic desire to keep ones word.
It is not straightforward to come up with a design that could separate the two explana-
tions. The key is to nd messages that a¤ect whether the decision to contribute or not would
turn the focal meaning of the message into a lie, while not involving an explicit promise.
An admittedly somewhat contrived example would be a treatment with the following two
messages: if you contribute your payo¤ will be the same as my payo¤and if you do not
contribute your payo¤ will be the same as my payo¤. In equilibrium, the informed player
could send the latter message when the state is low, and the former message when the state
is intermediate or high. In both the intermediate and the high state, the informed player
can only prevent the message if you contribute your payo¤ will be the same as my payo¤
from being a lie by contributing herself since this message will induce the uninformed player
to contribute. At the same time, the message is not an explicit promise about the informed
players action. So, a treatment with these two messages would separate the cost of lying
argument from the argument that people want to keep their promises.
Irrespective of the outcomes of such a treatment, though, the present paper shows that
it is interesting and important to pay attention to the focal meaning of messages. This




Proposition 1 The baseline game has a unique Nash Equilibrium, given by (; ) =
f(0; 0; 1); 0g.
Proof. Since a+b+c3 < 1, it is a strictly dominant strategy for U to choose xU= 0. Since a, b <1, xI= 0
is a strictly dominant action for I; when s = a or s = b. On the contrary, since c > 1, when s = c, it is
a strictly dominant strategy for I to choose xI= 1.
Proposition 2 The game with Actions has a unique Nash Equilibrium, (; ) = f(0; 1; 1);
(0; 1)g:
Proof.- As in SerraGarcia, van Damme, Potters (2008)- We will prove the stronger result that strategy
prole X is the only one that survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Since a  0 I has xI= 0 as a strictly dominant action for s = a. From a+ b+ c < 3, it follows that
U will respond to xI= 0 by not contributing either: seeing xI= 0 makes him less optimistic that the state
is intermediate or good. This in turn implies that I has xIs= 1 as her dominant action when s = c. Since
b+ c > 2, this in turn implies that U will contribute after a contribution of I . Having established that, for
U , only = (0; 1) survives the elimination of dominated strategies, it easily follows that xIb = 1, hence,
that = (0; 1; 1) is the unique surviving strategy for I
Proposition 3 There are two pure strategy equilibrium outcomes in the game with Words,
given by, respectively:
(1) X() = (Xa(); Xb(); Xc()) = (0; 0; 1) and
(m) = 0 for all m 2Ms(); where s = fa; b; cg
(2) X() = (Xa(); Xb(); Xc()) = (0; 0; 1) and
(m) = 0 for all m 2Ma();while (m) = 1 for all m 2M b() [M c()
Proof. First of all, note that player i strictly prefers player j (j 6= i) to contribute when s>0, while she
strictly prefers the other not to contribute when s<0. Write Di for the di¤erence in (expected) payo¤ for
player i between contributing (xi=1) and not (xi=0). It is easily seen thatDi = E(s)  1. It immediately
follows that the informed player will not contribute when s=a,b and will contribute when s=c.
For now, assume a<0. If player U follows a constant strategy (y(m) = y for all m 2M ), then
equilibrium requires y= 0, as there is at least one message where y= 0 is a best response. There can be
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many equilibria of this type, and there are at least jM j pure equilibria of this type, one for each m 2M .
All these equilibria are uninformative; talk is considered pure cheap talk.
Next, assume that player Us strategy is not constant. Letm be a message with the highest probability
that player U contributes, while m denotes one with the lowest. If these messages are unique, then types
b and c will choose m, while type a will choose m. Equilibrium requires that y(m) = 1 and y(m) = 0,
and this is indeed an equilibrium. We see that there are multiple pure semi-separating equilibria, but that
these all yield the same outcome. Of course, m and m need not be unique. Non-uniqueness of m does not
create specic problems. Suppose m is not unique. As type a will not choose any such m, there must exist
at least one m where player U attaches beliefs of at least 1
2
to facing type c and, hence chooses y(m) = 1.
In the equilibrium, only such m will be chosen by both b and c. These types can di¤er a bit in their
strategies, but not too much. This still generates the same pure semi-separating outcome. Consequently, if
a<0, there are only two equilibrium outcomes: one in which player U never contributes, and another one in
which he contributes for sure after some messages, there is no contribution after other messages, and there
is randomization after a third set of messages. In this second equilibrium, types b and c randomize among
messages in the rst set, a randomizes among messages in the second set, and messages in the third set
appear with zero probability.
Let us nally consider a = 0. It will be clear from the above argument that, if we restrict ourselves to
pure strategies, (only) the two equilibrium outcomes exist that were identied above. If a = 0, however,
type a is indi¤erent between what U does, hence, he could randomize between m and m. If he randomizes,
the result can be such that DU= E(sjm) = 0, so that U can randomize as well. This then gives rise to
various mixed equilibria. We do not specify further details here, as these can be lled in by the reader.
Proposition 4 Only an inuential equilibrium is neologism-proof.
Proof. A pooling equilibrium is not neologism-proof as the set T = fb; cg is a self-signaling set, rel-
ative to this equilibrium. A similar remark applies for any mixed strategy equilibrium in which types b
and c do not receive their best payo¤. On the other hand, a partially separating equilibrium is trivially
neologism-proof, as, in this case, the informed player receives the best possible payo¤ in each state of nature.
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